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Egypt Brotherhood elects new head

  • Jan. 17th, 2010 at 12:15 AM

[From the BBC: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8463323.stm]
Egypt's outlawed opposition Islamist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, has named a conservative figure, Mohammed Badi, as its new leader.

Mr Badi, a 66-year-old veterinary professor at Beni Suef University, will be the eighth general guide since 1928.

His election by senior members of the group follows internal elections last year in which conservatives did well and prominent reformists were defeated.

He succeeds Mohammed Mahdi Akif, who became the first leader to step down.

The Brotherhood has influenced Islamist movements around the world with its model of political activism combined with charity work.

“ Show the world the true Islam, the Islam of moderation and forgiveness that respects pluralism in the whole world ”
Mohammed Badi
It has been banned from open political activity since 1954, and leading activists are frequently arrested and imprisoned by the authorities.

Despite this, Brotherhood members standing as independent candidates won 20% of the seats in the last parliamentary election in 2005, its best ever result.

Regional impact

After the announcement of his election by the group's Shura Council on Saturday, Mr Badi told members: "Show the world the true Islam, the Islam of moderation and forgiveness that respects pluralism in the whole world."

Analysts say a conservative leader is likely to steer the Brotherhood away from political activism, and instead focus on religious and social work.

The government has also passed laws making it harder to contest future elections, including October's parliamentary polls.

"There are two causes for the regression of political work. The first is intense government pressures and the constitutional changes made on participation in elections," Diaa Rashwan told the AFP news agency.

"The other factor is that Mr Badi is not involved in public work - he is part of the ideological work," he added.

Another analyst, Khalil al-Anani, warned that the Brotherhood's withdrawal from political life, coupled with the government's continuing crackdown on Islamists, might leave a vacuum that more militant voices could fill in the future.

The BBC's Yolande Knell in Cairo says the path the Brotherhood chooses under Mr Badi will have implications beyond Egypt.

It is related to other Islamist groups in the Arab world, many of whom are also debating the merits of political engagement, she says.

Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/8463323.stm

Published: 2010/01/16 14:53:15 GMT

© BBC MMX

Islamophobia in Switzerland

  • Nov. 30th, 2009 at 8:57 AM

Muslims Fume Over Swiss Minaret Ban
Written by Rachelle Kliger
Published Monday, November 30, 2009
The Swiss ban on the construction of new minarets has angered Muslims and human rights groups.
The Swiss decision to ban the building of new minarets in Switzerland is sending shockwaves throughout the Muslim world.
Muslims and human rights groups have expressed outrage at the decision, depicting it as an attack on Islam and a setback for religious freedom.
More than 57% of Swiss voters approved the proposal Sunday in a nationwide referendum backed by Switzerland’s right-wing Swiss People’s Party (SVP), widely associated with anti-immigration campaigns.
"It’s an indication that fascist and far-right groups are growing in number and in strength," Sheikh Ibrahim Mogra, Assistant Secretary-General for the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) and an imam for the Muslim community in Leicester told The Media Line.
"This should be very worrying for all decent Europeans who wish to see the diversity of our continent continue in order to help our communities be cohesive and peaceful," he said. "The MCB is extremely disappointed that a country in modern-day Europe has such a significant population with such a dislike for diversity, particularly for Islam and for Muslims."
There are concerns the referendum results will have a similar effect to the 2005 Danish political cartoons, in which depictions of the Prophet Muhammad sparked anti-Danish boycotts and violent demonstrations throughout the Muslim world.
"I would call upon all Muslims not to demonstrate or take to the streets," Mogra stressed. "This simply gives ammunition to those who wish to portray us as violent extremists. We need to be dignified and challenge this through the democratic process that we have available to us as Europeans."
Egyptian Mufti Ali Gomaa denounced the vote, calling it an "insult" to Muslims around the world and "provocative behavior," but urged Muslims to be restrained in their response.
The Washington-based Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) urged U.S. President Barack Obama to use his upcoming address at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point to speak out against the decision, calling it a move that is "a violation of religious freedom and a breach of international law."
The human rights advocacy group Amnesty International said it "deeply regrets" the decision, stating that it "violates both the freedom of religion of Muslims living in the country and the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of religious belief, as set out in several international human rights instruments, that Switzerland is a party to."
"The general prohibition of the construction of minarets violates the right of Muslims in Switzerland to manifest their religion," Amnesty said in a statement. "It can do lasting damage to their integration."
Claude Moniquet, Chief Executive of the European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center said the Swiss were likely to receive negative reaction from around the world.
"It’s very clear that the Swiss authorities could have problems inside Switzerland with local groups calling for terrorist attacks," Moniquet told The Media Line. "They will also likely face problems outside Switzerland, with Swiss interests put at risk in North Africa, in the Gulf, and in Muslim countries. It will be a huge challenge for them."
Moniquet was skeptical over concerns that the Swiss financial industry will suffer, with speculation that wealthy Arabs and Muslims might withdraw savings from Swiss bank accounts.
"When you’re a billionaire and you want to put your money somewhere, Switzerland remains maybe the best place in the world," he said. "So it could marginally affect the economy of Switzerland but not in a fundamental way."
"Many people in Europe think we have a problem of integration with the Muslim minority and I think it’s true," Moniquet added. "We have a problem, but banning the minarets cannot solve the problem. It will just raise the communities against each other. It will not help to resolve coexistence in the integration program."
Moniquet argued that the referendum stemmed from two factors.
"One is general, and you find it across Europe, and that’s the fear of Islamists and the fear of Islam," he said. "The other is a pure Swiss problem: The Swiss always had a problem with foreigners and they don’t like them…I call it Swiss racism."
An op-ed in the Qatari daily A-Raya said the referendum was the worst gift Muslims received for Eid Al-Adha.
"This indicates an increase in racism in Europe in general, and especially in Switzerland," it read. "It’s odd that this racist tendency comes at a time when the Arab and Muslim streets are showing more awareness for the need to respect religious freedom of minorities and individuals and focus on values of tolerance and acknowledgment of the other."
Following the referendum, the government said it would respect the decision of the people and will not permit the construction of new minarets. The decision will not affect the building of mosques or the four existing minarets in the country.
Switzerland has a population of 7.6 million people, of whom more than 4% are Muslim, mostly from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia.
The minaret, a tower adjacent to a mosque, is a visible symbol of Islam. The call to prayer is made from the minaret, but this call is banned in Switzerland.
Right-wing Swiss parties have depicted the minarets as symbols of Islamic militancy.
Copyright © 2008 The Media Line. All Rights Reserved.

 www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-thur-nw-cia-renditionnov05,0,31329.story

chicagotribune.com

Italian court convicts 23 Americans of kidnapping Muslim cleric

Case is blow to anti-terrorism program known as extraordinary rendition

By Maria de Cristofaro and Sebastian Rotella

Tribune Newspapers

November 5, 2009

ROME

-- An Italian judge convicted 23 Americans on Wednesday of kidnapping an Egyptian cleric off the streets of Milan in 2003, a sweeping verdict against one of the CIA's most valued anti-terrorism tools -- the practice known as extraordinary rendition.

The decision was a victory for Italian anti-terrorism prosecutors and police who spent six years building a massive case. The two-year trial exposed details of a secretive world and was the first anywhere to challenge the program under which the CIA abducted suspects and spirited them to third countries for interrogation.

A clandestine team of U.S. and Italian operatives abducted Osama Moustafa Hassan Nasr, also known as Abu Omar, a militant cleric suspected of recruiting fighters for Iraq and Afghanistan, and he was flown to Egypt, where he claims to have undergone months of torture and abuse.

The case sparked international uproar, and the governments of Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and his predecessor tried repeatedly to scuttle the trial.

"I think it is very important for everyone that this trial was completed," said Armando Spataro, the lead prosecutor. He added: "The message of this important ruling -- to nations, governments, institutions, secret services, etc. -- is that we cannot use illegal instruments in our effort against terrorism. Our democracies, otherwise, would betray their principles."

Judge Oscar Magi acquitted three other Americans, including the former CIA station chief in Italy, because of diplomatic immunity. He also set aside charges against five Italian intelligence officials, including the former chief and deputy chief of Italy's spy agency. But he convicted two other Italians.

The trial was held in Milan, and the Americans were in absentia. Given that the U.S. government has declined to cooperate with the prosecution, it seemed unlikely that any would spend time in an Italian prison. However, the convicted Americans may be at risk if they travel to Europe. 

The judge issued an eight-year prison sentence for Robert Seldon Lady, the former CIA chief in Milan. Testimony indicated that Lady initially opposed abducting Nasr as unnecessary and dangerous but ultimately became the ground-level architect of the operation. The other U.S. operatives were given five-year sentences, and the Italians received three-year terms.

"The Milan court sent a powerful message: The CIA can't just abduct people off the streets," said Joanne Mariner, terrorism program director at Human Rights Watch. "It's illegal, unacceptable and unjustified."

The Bush administration aggressively expanded a rendition program that was already in place. Human-rights advocates believe U.S. agents transported terrorism suspects to the custody of countries including Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Libya and Syria. The exact number of people is unknown. 

The Obama administration has cracked down on what it calls abusive tactics, but U.S. officials have said spy agencies will continue renditions, albeit with more oversight. On Wednesday, the CIA declined to comment, as it has throughout. 

Special correspondent de Cristofaro reported from Rome, and Rotella from Washington. Tribune Newspapers reporters Julian E. Barnes, Paul Richter and Greg Miller in Washington contributed to this report.

srotella@tribune.com
 


 June 7, 2009
 

The Divisions Among Israelis and Palestinians

JERUSALEM — As President Obama was arriving in Cairo on Thursday to urge the Middle East toward peace, Hamas militants in the West Bank city of Qalqilya were fighting a gun battle against Palestinian Authority forces in which three men were killed. Israel Radio was reporting that settler extremists had sent letters to an Israeli general threatening him and his children, and comparing the forces that remove settler outposts with the Jewish councils obliged to collaborate with the Nazis.

No matter how seriously and intelligently Mr. Obama presses Israel and the Palestinians to make peace with each other, little is likely to be accomplished until something else is addressed: the fierce and explosive divisions within each society between those who favor a deal and those who oppose one.

As Yisrael Wolman, an editor at the newspaper Yediot Aharonot, wrote, “It isn’t clear whether the new American administration’s aggressive initiative will promote the prospects of peace in the region, but it will undoubtedly lead us quickly to an ugly confrontation within Israel.”

In truth, such a confrontation is always just below the surface in both societies, rearing up when compromise in the name of coexistence is placed on the agenda. This is because, despite Mr. Obama’s assertion that all sides would benefit from peace, the idea of a win-win outcome is foreign to the tribal mentality. In this region, when you win, your opponent loses.

Shimon Peres, Israel’s president, was foreign minister in 1993 when Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization reached agreement in Oslo for mutual recognition and peaceful coexistence. Two years later, as efforts to put the agreement into effect were faltering, Mr. Peres told a small group of foreign correspondents that the challenge of making the accord work was heightened by the fact that only half of one nation had decided to seek peace with half of the other, which made disruption easy.

Oslo is now widely viewed by both sides as a failure. Since Mr. Peres’s comment, the poll numbers have shifted. Sometimes more and sometimes fewer than half favor a deal, generally defined as a two-state solution. But whatever the proportions — it depends greatly on how the question is phrased and on what atrocity recently occurred — a substantial part of each society so deeply mistrusts the other that it can fight off an accord. Many Israeli governments have fallen over the issue.

There are striking parallels between the hard-core opponents of a peace deal on each side. They are generally driven by a belief in a law higher than any created by human legislatures; they are exceptionally motivated; and they are very well organized.

“It is the religious fervor that makes the anti-peace camp so much more effective and better organized on both sides,” said Yossi Alpher, the Israeli co-editor ofbitterlemons.org, a Web site devoted to Israeli-Palestinian dialogue, and former director of a strategic studies center at Tel Aviv University. “Look at how settlers go to wealthy Jews and evangelical Christians to raise money and how Hamas taps into a huge reservoir of Islamist money.”

While those who lead the struggle against any peace deal are rebels, those who promote coexistence seek normality, and are loath to engage in tire burning or disruptive protests. This puts them at a disadvantage.

There is another parallel. Both Zionism and Palestinian nationalism were born in the fight against foreign rule. The Zionists rebelled against the British through surreptitiousimmigration and settlement as well as armed struggle. The Palestinians have, of course, been fighting the Israeli occupiers. One result is that among each society’s greatest heroes are violent lawbreakers who stood up to power. Expunging the message that defiance of the law is worthy of honor has been a challenge. West Bank settlers have something in common with the Zionist settlers of a century ago. They plant facts on the ground, often over the objections of the official authorities.

Among Palestinians, the problem is worse. Hamas has risen markedly in popularity and power, while the power of Israel’s religious parties has stayed relatively constant. Still, because of the Israeli political system, the power of the religious right has been disproportionate, as it is in the government. “They punch above their weight politically,” noted Gerald Steinberg, chairman of the political science department of Bar Ilan University. “And by threatening and using violence, a small percentage of settlers have power in great disproportion to their numbers.”

Mr. Steinberg rejected what he called an “artificial symmetry” between the peace opponents in Israel and among the Palestinians, saying 15 percent of the Israeli public opposed a deal on ideological grounds whereas the percentage was much higher among Palestinians — possibly the majority, given the strength of Hamas.

There has been a growing disillusionment in Israel with peace negotiations, he said, but he traced it to a practical concern, not ideology. The concern, he said, is that the Palestinians could not live up to a deal because of their own internal disputes and the power of Hamas. In addition, the rise of Iranian influence in the region makes Israelis fear that withdrawing from occupied land brings Israel within rocket range of hostile forces that might not let the Palestinians live in peace with Israel, even if they wanted to.

The Palestinians point to four decades of settlement building and military actions like the offensive in Gaza in January as evidence that Israel is not serious about two states. Meanwhile, internally they are more fissured than ever. Not only are they divided between Hamas rule in Gaza and Fatah domination in the West Bank, but divisions are deep within Fatah.

“Fatah follows an old Soviet style of a politburo, trying to make consensus decisions, which has been a total failure,” a Western democracy trainer who has worked with Fatah for four years argued. He insisted that his name not be used so he could speak openly about a group he works with.

Moreover, he said, the unity talks between Fatah and Hamas in Cairo are part of a double game. The Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, privately opposes reconciliation, preferring the defeat of Hamas, yet he sends negotiators, ostensibly to cut a deal.

A poll last week carried out by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research found that most Palestinians have no faith that the two movements will reconcile, and a majority say they are worried that they or a member of their family will be hurt by other Palestinians.

Meanwhile, the Israeli government has vowed to dismantle illegal settler outposts, but a group of right-wing rabbis has called on Israeli soldiers and policemen to defy any removal order.

The statement called the government’s decision to enforce Israeli law through such removals, “an act that will widen further the schism between the people and the army.” Should Mr. Obama ultimately have his way, with a Palestinian state planned for the areas where those settlers live, that schism could turn into a chasm.

Egypt Under Hosni Mubarak

  • Aug. 14th, 2009 at 8:16 AM

The last weeks have seen huge protests in Iran over their stolen presidential election. The Iranian people have a reputation for boisterous resistance and revolution. But the current president of Iran is hardly the only  illegitimate leader in the region. Since the 1950's, Egypt has been governed by a terrible dictatorship. Gamal Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and now Hosni Mubarak have ruled the Nile Valley like Pharohs (which sometimes Egyptians derisively call them). But no revolution. Over the next couple entries, I'd like to explore the nature of dictatorship in Egypt and of resistance to it. But first, there was an interesting article in the Chicago Tribune (from the LA Times), a profile of a Cairo neighborhood that would serve as an excellent introduction:

www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/la-fg-neighborhood14-2009aug14,0,5761586.story

chicagotribune.com

COLUMN ONE

In Cairo neighborhood, good times are over but life continues

A pocket of alleys and a square, Tora is stubborn and enduring and, like Egypt, struggles from first light to long after the last working man wanders home.

By Jeffrey Fleishman

August 14, 2009

Reporting from Cairo

He dances in the alley when the music's right, remembering the days when he made machine guns during the week and in his off hours slipped on a satin shirt and black-and-white shoes and gathered a band of horn blowers to play weddings along the Nile.

He was the singer, a high-rise hairdo and a voice to match. The neighborhood knew him, but the neighborhood pretty much knew everybody; still, Saber Saad felt special, microphone in hand, his two-tones tapping in the lights, the wind carrying his music through marsh grass and out to the desert, dying somewhere beneath the stars.

Age, he says. It takes. The horn blowers have scattered. His hair has turned gray, and his voice is as scratchy as sand against paper. But twice a day, when he pulls the mosque key from his pocket, the neighborhood can hear Saad, like a song from a half-tuned radio, call men and boys to prayer in the cool shadows past the billiard hall. God is great.

The neighborhood is small. Tora is its name. A brick and shutter pocket of alleys and a square, bounded by the Nile to the west and Cairo's heart to the north, Tora is stubborn and enduring and, like Egypt, struggles from first light to long after the last working man wanders home. With sparse shops and women peeking down from windows, the square is a dusty stage of entrances and exits, some boisterous, others hushed and hurried.

The Nile teases Tora. Flowing beneath jacaranda and sycamore, the river is cut off from the neighborhood by a highway, fences and private clubs. It was once easy to walk the grassy banks, and people still do, but the Nile is not theirs anymore. The alleys are. They winnow and widen and winnow again. You wouldn't find them unless you were from here or tricked by a map.

Saad recognizes every face he passes. When he climbs the four stories to his roof, where he keeps homing pigeons and a goat, he can see chalky cliffs in the distance, and if he listens he can hear from below the cicada-like prattle of voices and stories he's known for more than half a century.

He'd have to be 15 floors up not to hear Fahima Ibrahim. She booms. A husky woman, with loop earrings and a smooth face, she keeps money in a tin can and runs a small grocery on the square. She sits beneath an overhead fan; gossip collides around her and she peers from the shade like a blackbird waiting for a trinket to drop.

There's no sneaking past her, minding things near the cola cooler and burning incense from Sudan to fend off envy spirits. She chats about past and future and makes a face at Abdelaal, the taxi driver, who's yapping about matters he shouldn't.

"I was born here 54 years ago," she says. "My family was here before that. We're from Cairo. I have four sons and four grandchildren. The people in this neighborhood, we can't afford fun, except to go out and stand by the Nile."

She breathes in incense. The melon man passes through the square, followed by the clattering of the boy with a crooked-wheeled cart selling propane gas in canisters that look as if they might explode. Round the corner, two women, close friends, argue over why one didn't invite the other to a wedding. Tunics billow.

"Fifteen years ago, charities with foreign money used to come into the neighborhood to help people," Ibrahim says. "I don't think they do that anymore."

The silver rack in Ahmed Morsy's laundry shop across the way holds two hangers. There would be more, but times are not so good and people do their ironing at home rather than bring it to him, a thin man with a cigarette dangling over the Singer sewing machine his grandfather, once the neighborhood's tailor, sat at. Through the sunlight in the square he is a shadow, his iron cool and turned up like a pyramid.

"It happened gradually, every year we lost a little bit of business," says Morsy, who charges the equivalent of 12 cents a shirt. "I used to iron 70 pieces a day, now I'm down to about 20. I'd like to buy new dry-cleaning machines and make a proper laundry, but not now."

In the doorway is a big man with a voice good for whispering secrets. He once worked for the Ministry of Intelligence. He keeps a second house in another part of the city, but he's partial to Tora, even though it's changed since he was a boy. Yes, he knows time moves on, and that childhood, even a poor one, often seems sweeter than it was when measured against the present. But still, the old days were better.

"When I was young it was beautiful," says Sayed Adly. "We lived together and whoever was cooking fed the neighborhood. We were a big family. If a groom was coming to propose to a girl, the girl's father would come around and ask us about the guy. 'Is he a good man? Can he be trusted?'

We've lost our closeness, though. We sleep with our doors closed and locked."

An earthquake shook the neighborhood in 1992. Nobody died, but houses and shops turned creaky. Brick and concrete were fortified, and a neighborhood of one- and two-story homes grew into four- and five-story buildings. The sun had to climb higher to brighten the square. Other changes had already started; money was good in the 1980s and people bought things and aspired, but it's been rough for the last decade and neighbors want what they can't have. Dope dealers and thieves linger at the edges alongside men with promises bigger than their wiles.

"People here used to be ignorant to what was going on outside this neighborhood. You could live your whole life here without ever leaving," says Mohamed Hanafy, a balding man with a wispy goatee who has a degree in agriculture and runs a shop that sells paint and plumbing fixtures. "But then people got more educated and they desired more. They started venturing into the manic pace of the city. They wanted to live like they saw on TV."

Satellite dishes clutter rooftops and when the sun hits that blistering point in the sky, the wood-slatted shutters close. Slap, slap, slap. Girls in hijabs trade stories in the shade, waiting to be called by mothers to scrub beans and find brothers. Slap, slap, slap, the wood-slatted shutters close. The woman who fixes bicycles slips away from the sprockets and spokes of her greasy shop, hands clean, like a mystery that makes you think, how? The breeze from the Nile must be lost in the alley; nothing's blowing in the square. The vegetable man winces over his onions, flies buzz like drunks. Slap, slap, slap, the wood-slatted shutters close.

Here comes Ibrahim Ahmed Hassan, jean-clad and slender, walking as if he woke up with more money in his pocket than what he went to bed with. Hassan wants to go to America. He better not marry a foreign girl, not like his brother's friend, who brought home a Russian. That would break his mother's heart.

How do you know? She's right there telling him so, just as he sits down with a pizza that a little kid standing near a stoop is eyeing, but won't have a chance to taste. Hassan eats fast.

Hassan is a business major at the university. He was a soccer midfielder. He once thought, like boys do, that he'd turn professional and play on all the pretty fields around the world. Madrid. London. Rome. Another kid from the neighborhood did that -- Mohamed Abdel Monsef is a big-time goalkeeper and sometimes he comes back here with his wife, an actress. The pudgy man sitting next to Hassan has been quiet, but talk of soccer prompts him to mention that he went to school with Monsef. He leaves it at that.

"I played for three or four youth clubs, but the uniforms and the travel got too expensive," Hassan says. "I had to focus on my future. . . . If I don't get something in banking or the petroleum industry, there's not much else."

A scrim blocks the sun from Gamal Sayed Ibrahim's shop, which sells clocks, batteries, stuffed animals and glue. He makes copies too. His white tunic matches his hair, both perfectly cut; he moves deliberately but in no special hurry. He's a retired janitor and the shop is mostly a way to shorten the hours of a day. His rent is about $38 a month, but in May his profit was only $4. He's not a man who worries.

"Life's not as easy as it was," he says. "I think the bond between us has grown in this neighborhood. You can't afford to have differences in these times. You help someone today, they'll help you tomorrow."

Shoo. He chases away a goat that has slipped under the sheet. The light through the scrim makes an amber glow and you can hear but can't see what's going on in the square.

Ibrahim is like many here when asked about the good times of late. There is a pause, hand scratches chin, lips purse. The good times?

There was that dusk during Ramadan a few years back when commuters out on the Corniche el Nile were trapped in traffic and weren't going to make it home at sunset to break their fasts. The neighborhood cooked and passed out food to strangers. That was a good time. The days on the Nile were good, too, but they seem long, long ago.

"In a way, the Nile has been taken from us," Ibrahim says. "There are private clubs along the shore and the government has confiscated land. We used to go to the river to wash our clothes, fish and barbecue and spend the night. You can't do that anymore. I last swam in the Nile in the 1980s."

Ibrahim walks to see his sister, the one who fixes bicycles. Women in the square are singing and ululating, music pounds from speakers. Boys and girls clap and dance.

In a few days, the neighborhood will gather for the wedding of Hamad and Hadeer, a street cop and his cousin. It's time to prepare. A wooden block in the shape of a bed is laid in the square and women come with cotton, satin, chiffon and lace. They trim sheets, sew comforters, stuff and stitch pillows. The wedding bed is slowly made. Music rises. Then stops.

Minarets crackle with the call to prayer. Men and boys wind through the alleys and past the billiard hall to the mosque. They prostrate. God is great. All goodness is in Him.

Prayers finish and the music begins anew, and out of the mosque comes Saber Saad, machine-gun maker and crooner, swaying in his sandals.

His voice? No, it doesn't work anymore, not to sing, not the way he wants. He points to his throat, rasps a few words. He walks through the alley. Hassan follows.

Saad says things aren't good in Egypt under President Hosni Mubarak. The sick don't get better and the poor stay trapped.

"Ah, you're going to jail now. You mentioned Mubarak," Hassan says.

"I better go pack."

Saad and Hassan laugh and walk farther into the alley and then take a left, down an even narrower alley to Saad's house. He lives on the second floor, his son lives on the third, and on the roof, paradise.

Saad dips under a trellis of hanging vines and sits in a high-back chair that looks as if it had been stolen from an old French palace. It's dusty and, like his voice, has lost its majesty, but you can imagine what it was in its day. Hassan plops next to him.

Saad has nine fingers. He lost one after he smacked it with a hammer at the weapons factory; it became infected and the doctor said, "We better cut it off." He retired in January after 32 years of making guns.

The roof is his place. He keeps 20 homing pigeons in a big wooden pen rising on stilts above the trellis. Egypt has a bird flu outbreak and the government has forbidden the domestic raising of pigeons, geese and ducks. But that's one edict Saad is not likely to honor.

"I've loved pigeons since I was a boy."

Voices drift up. Singing women, shrieking children, men coming home from work. He listens and smiles on this rooftop with a view of cliffs and the Nile.

He tells stories, and by dusk the music below has quieted and there's a wedding bed in the square with tucked linens and heart-shaped pillows.

It seems to have fallen from the sky, but it was made by hands and will sit a little longer, until the women fold the linens and gather the pillows and deliver them to the small neighborhood flat where Hamad and Hadeer will begin their lives together.

jeffrey.fleishman@latimes.com

Amro Hassan of The Times' Cairo Bureau contributed to this report.


Today's Qool Quran Quote

  • Apr. 21st, 2009 at 11:45 PM

 "Let not the Unbelievers think that they have got away and got the better of the godly: they will never frustrate them. / Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into the hearts of the enemies, of God and your enemies, and others besides, whom you may not know, but whom God does know. Whatever you shall spend in the Cause of God, shall be repaid to you, and you shall not be treated unjustly. / But if the enemy incline towards peace, you also incline towards peace, and trust in God: for He is the One that hears and knows all things."
Quran 8:59-61

The first couple lines of this verse are often-cited by groups like al-Qaeda to defend the tactics of terrorism, "to strike terror into the hearts of the enemies..." but they almost always conveniently leave out the last line, "But if the enemy incline towards peace, you also incline toward peace..." Moderate Islamists use the last line to indicate that jihad should only be invoked as a defensive measure, never offensive.

This passage was revealed during Muhammad's time in Medina, when he and his followers were locked in struggle with the elites of Mecca, who had thrown them out. The Quran contains many passages pertaining to warfare, because during its revelation, the Islamic community was struggling for survival against many enemies. So the Quran is a fascinating mix of commandments, some lofty and some practical. Problems can arise, however, when passages are taken out of their correct context.

Today's Qool Quran Quote

  • Apr. 4th, 2009 at 5:18 PM

"In the name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful.

Read! in the name of your Lord and Cherisher, who created
created man, out of a mere clot of congealed blood:
Read! And your Lord is Most Bountiful
He Who taught the use of the Pen
taught man that which he knew not!"
Quran 96:1-5

These words, while toward the end of the standard Quran, were actually the very first words that God spoke to Muhammad. Throughout the ages, progressive Muslim leaders have invoked this passage to advocate quality public education; Muslim Spain had the highest literacy rate in Europe for many centuries. Less progressive Muslim leaders have invoked it to advocate the memorization of the Quran in religious schools, so that many Muslims who do not understand Arabic can still recite Quranic passages by heart in classical Arabic - the equivalent of an American reciting the Bible by heart in Latin.


Part 3: Tying it all together

In my last entry, I discussed a few of the groups associated with terrorism and Islam-inspired violence. For the most part they use religious rhetoric to further goals that are actually political. Most "religious" conflicts are like that. Hamas may call itself an Islamist organization - and it is - but it's main issue is Israel's occupation of Palestine. Iran is theocratic, yes, but it is also the most democratic state in the Middle East. Iran has a long rivalry with the United States and Israel, but that is not because of religion - it's politics.
    The Iraqi insurgents are the products of anarchy and occupation, and they give us some insight into the causes of Islamic terrorism. They are poor; they are powerless; they see very few opportunities to better their lot in life, except for participation in insurgent and revolutionary activities. But they very much disagree about the best way forward in their country; they disagree so strongly, and have so little faith in their society's ability to discuss and compromise, that they turn to violence. Sometimes they also turn to religion; sometimes not. But they are not an essentially religious group.
    And so we come to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Of the groups discussed previously, they are the only two who actually fit the violent Muslim extremist profile. Unlike the other groups, the goals of the Taliban and al-Qaeda are just as much religious as they are political. The Taliban imposed a very strict theocracy on Afghanistan, based on their interpretations of Islam. They didn't use religious rhetoric to further political goals - religion was their political goal. But luckily for the rest of the world, the Taliban limited their agenda to "Islamifying" Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda is not so conservative; they want to unite all the Muslim world under their idea of an Islamic government. 
    Where do they get off? How do they justify their holy war against not just the West, but every Muslim who doesn't see things their way? Does Islam really justify this kind of violence?
    In a way, we are finding out.
    The religion of Islam is based on three things: the Quran, of course; the Sunna, or Traditions, of the Prophet (the example he set through word and deed); and ijtihad, religious study and logical interpretation. The Quran is timeless, the word of God, inalterable and unchanging as its sister-books, the Torah and the Bible. The Sunna is also fairly set, though there is still some debate about whether Muhammad actually said this or did that, etc. 
    Ijtihad, however, the use of reason to figure out God's wishes for a certain situation, is constantly changing. During the Middle Ages, religious scholars rose to prominence and a class of clergy, ulama (singular: alim) was established. These ulama were educated, read Arabic, and devoted tons of time to reading and thinking about religion. They would issue religious opinions (fatwas) on subjects, and guide their followers. 
    But there was no hierarchy, not really anyway. There was no Muslim pope (even the Caliph was more a political than religious leader); so there was always room to reinterpret laws as time went on and situations changed. This is how so many things that aren't in the Quran or Sunna became identified with Islam (i.e. the veiling of women, beards for men, etc.). But the number of people who interpreted these laws and issued fatwas was always very small.
    Fast-forward to present-day. The Middle East is impoverished. They've been haunted by the legacy of colonialism, which destroyed their societies and robbed their treasuries. They live under a series of repressive and/or corrupt governments in which they have no say.
    But! They can read. The lieracy rate in the Middle East skyrocketed during the 20th century. Suddenly, it wasn't just an educated, thoughtful few who could read the Quran and the Sunna and interpret their laws. Suddenly lots of people could do this, and every Tom, Dick, and Harry with an opinion could issue a fatwa based on something they read.
    Islam is in the midst of a Reformation, argues Reza Aslan in his excellent book No god but God. Just like the Christian Reformation, it's caused by a growth of literacy and reason and science in the Muslim world. Just like the Christian Reformation, it is not going to be pretty. The Christian Reformation produced wars and terrorism, Inquisitions and persecutions, lots of horrible things we Europeans would rather forget about. But they happened, and in the end, the dust settled, and Christianity (both Catholic and Protestant) was better off in the end. Europeans embraced a separation of church and state, embraced reason and logic and science, and turned their backs on the dark ages of superstition and violence.
    Now Islam is in the same situation. Muslims everywhere are struggling for the soul of their faith. One one side you have the traditionalists, those who like Islam where it is. Islam is a powerful personal tool for living a just and moral life, regardless of politics and outsiders, of which they may be suspicious. On another side you have the modernists, who want more than anything to reform Islam to something they feel is more appropriate to the 21st century. They do not see a contradiction between modernization and Islam. To them Islam is a living thing, created by God to be adaptable and versatile, useful to everyday people in every age. And on yet another side you have the extremists, those puritanical individuals and groups who have a very narrow definition of what "true" Islam is. They are absolutely certain of themselves and their views, and they have convinced themselves that every Muslim who disagrees with them is not a true Muslim.
    In this struggle for the future of Islam, the outcome is by no means assured. The extremists are the smaller numbers, but they have the drive and the guns. The traditionalists have the numbers but neither drive nor power of any kind. The modernists have no guns, but they have a respectable drive and the weight of history at their backs. 
 
    So we return to the original question of this three-part post. Does Islam preach violence and terrorism? Well, that's up to Muslims to decide. There's certainly little to nothing in the Quran directly advocating aggression or terrorism. But some Muslims, like those who are in al-Qaeda, believe that violence and terrorism are excuseable through logical induction. They invoke jihad to mean "holy war," and they believe that the deaths of other Muslims can be excused by their cooperation with evil governments, evil societies, or non-Muslims. Other Muslims, like the New Islamists in Egypt, argue that virtually everything al-Qaeda stands for is nonsense, and none of it is backed up by the Quran or the Sunna. All religions have their share of violence, but no major religion can accurately be described as inherently violent. Religions are what their practitioners make of them. What Islam "is" depends on what Muslims do, and that will be determined by the outcome of this Reformation, this war for Muslim hearts and minds.
    One thing must also be said here. When an extremist preacher comes around, preaching intolerance and terrorism, a disillusioned young man with few economic or political opportunities is far more likely to answer the call to "jihad" than is a young man who feels a part of his society, who is well-versed on his own in the Quran, who has a life of prosperity and happiness ahead of him. Not all terrorists come from that background. But people with education and opportunities are less likely to pick up a gun for any reason.

 Poll finds unhappiness among group, despite economic successes

By Sarah Gantz

Tribune Newspapers

March 3, 2009


WASHINGTON — A study of Muslim Americans released Monday by the Gallup Center for Muslim Studies presents a portrait of an often misunderstood community—socioeconomically integrated but culturally alienated; succeeding in the workforce but struggling to find contentment.


The numbers suggest economic and career success among Muslim Americans—they have a higher employment rate than the national average and are among the nation's most educated religious groups. 

And while Muslim Americans are more likely than the general public to be employed and hold a professional job, according to the report, they also expressed less satisfaction with their standard of living and community. Only 41 percent described themselves as "thriving." 

The disparity is a sign of the alienation some Muslim Americans may feel, experts say. Ahmed Younis, a senior analyst for the center, said some Muslim Americans feel a sense of "otherness" created by outside perceptions of their religion and a lack of involvement in their larger community.

Three-quarters of Muslim Americans polled said they were satisfied with their community, as opposed to nearly 90 percent among respondents from other religions. And they were less optimistic about the future of their communities. Muslim Americans ranked highest among religious groups in the U.S. who believed their communities were getting worse.

The data reflect the responses recorded by 946 of more than 300,000 Americans surveyed over the course of 2008 who identified themselves as Muslim. The Gallup Center for Muslim Studies is a non-partisan research center affiliated with the Gallup polling organization.

"There's no doubt that there is a certain sense of isolation and alienation—there's no doubt," said Rep. Keith Ellison (D-Minn.), the first Muslim elected to Congress. 

Muslim Americans age 18 to 29 in particular reported discontent with their jobs and communities. On average, Muslim American youth were unhappier, angrier and less optimistic than their peers of other religious groups, according to the report. 

Only 78 percent of young Muslims reported having smiled or laughed the day before, while nearly 90 percent of Protestants, Catholics and Jews of the same age said they had. 

A great deal of the emotional turbulence among young Muslim Americans is the product of the stereotypes and suspicion of Islam in the post-Sept. 11 era, experts say.

Copyright 2009, Chicago Tribune



This is a problem. Traditionally, American Muslims have felt (and probably still feel) more culturally integrated and satisfied than Muslim immigrants in Europe, who are discriminated against and holed up in ghettos. Since 9/11, however, non-Muslim bias against them seems to have had a truly regressive impact.


Part 2: Modern Muslim Terrorism

Medieval Crusades and invasions aside, why do we in the West associate Muslims and Middle Easterners with violence and terrorism? The easy answer is because that's what we see on the news. Most news of violence in the world concerns the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the insurgency in Iraq; and the NATO/Taliban conflict in Afghanistan. All these conflicts involve Muslims and/or Arabs on at least one side. Similarly, when we think of the word "terrorist," we have a very specific idea in our minds. This person who comes to mind when we think of the word "terrorist" - what makes this person tick? Why does this person hate us? And why has he turned to violence?

First let's take a look at some of the violent groups in the news lately which can  be described as "Muslim" groups.

 

Hamas

"Hamas" is an acronym for "Harakat al-Muqawamat al-Islamiyya," or "the Islamic Resistance Movement." It's a political party and paramilitary group that arose from the refugee camps and occupied territories of the Palestinian people. Hamas is an Islamist organization, which means that their ultimate goal is the creation of a government that conforms with Islamic law (sharia). In the past, most Palestinian resistance groups have been secular nationalists, like Fatah. Palestinians themselves have traditionally been one of the most highly educated populations in the Arab world, and the most secular. But there are several reasons for Hamas's recent popularity. One is the general backlash in the Arab world against secular government, which is seen as oppressive, militaristic, and corrupt (because secular Arab governments have usually been all three). While Fatah officials were seen as fat cats, Hamas activists provided medical and food aid to the people, running schools and social programs. Say what you will about them, but they had a reputation for honor and incorruptibility.
    The other reason for Hamas's popularity was their unwavering opposition to all things Israel. The 1993 Oslo Accords were seen by many Palestinians as a failure. Fatah and the other nationalist Palestinian groups compromised and negotiated with Israel, and things turned out very badly for the Palestinians. Hamas, on the other hand, was not about negotiating, but about resisting Israel every step of the way.
    Palestinians voted for Hamas in the 2006 Palestinian Authority elections, giving them a majority in the first free and fair elections held in Palestine (The Jerusalem Post), not because they are overwhelmingly supportive of the group's Islamist agenda, but because they support social programs and resistance against Israel. Because of this, Hamas does less proselytizing than fighting.
    It is important to note that Hamas's target is specifically Israel. They have not attacked the US or any target outside of Israel. For this reason, it seems clear that Hamas is a very specific kind of group. They are violent; they are Muslim. But their violence has a cause that is not religious and can be understood as specific to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
 

Iran

In 1979 there was a revolution in Iran against the Shah, or king. This was a popular revolution, and not a particularly violent one. The people of Iran simply decided enough was enough, and nobody defended the Shah. He was so unpopular, in fact, that when he fled to America a reporter asked him where all his allies were, and he famously replied, "Search me."
    Every segment of Iranian society turned against the Shah, communists and businesspeople, intellectuals and peasants, Jews and Muslims. But one part would come to dominate the revolution in the following weeks: that of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The Ayatollah Khomeini had been an outspoken critic of the Shah's regime until he was exiled to France. As the revolution unfolded and he returned to Iran, he became a symbolic leader of the struggle. Gradually, his supporters took control of the revolution and founded a government that conformed to Khomeini's world view.
    This world view was egalitarian, anti-colonialist, and above all else, Islamic. Khomeini believed in a particular type of Islamism, which he called vilayet-e faqih, or "guardianship of the jurisprudent." Essentially, rule of the clergy.
    Revolutions are chaotic, and much happened during the Iranian Revolution. But for Americans, the incident that stands out most is the hostage crisis. On 4 November 1979, a group of Iranian students stormed the US Embassy and took 52 US citizens hostage. The debacle, and America's seeming impotence to do anything about it, dealt a severe blow to US prestige in the region, and although the hostages were eventually released, there has been bad blood between the US and Iran ever since.
    Khomeini didn't order the seizure, and by some accounts didn't even support it at first (Mark Bowden's book Guests of the Ayatollah provides some insight into this whole episode). But as a politician, Khomeini saw the popularity of the hostage-taking and eventually supported it. America was deeply unpopular in Iran at the time, because in 1953 the CIA had taken a leading role in overthrowing Iran's democratically-elected leader, Mohammad Mossadegh (Operation Ajax). Not only had America denied Iran democracy, but the US had then poured money into the Shah's armed forces, which were used primarily as tools of oppression.
    Iranians were angry at the US (and Britain, for that matter) for decades of interfering in Iran's business. The students who took the embassy, and the Iranians who supported them, did not dislike America for what it symbolized (freedom, secularism, Westernism), but for what America had done to them. They felt victimized and angry, and wanted to send a message to America to stop interfering with their country.
    In September 1980, Saddam Hussein launched an invasion of Iran, which he thought would be weak in the aftermath of the revolution. The US, still bitter toward Iran for the hostage crisis and the nationalization of US property in Iran, provided support for Saddam Hussein in this war, including chemical and biological weapons. The long and bloody conflict (it ended in a draw in 1988) further angered Iranians toward America.
    So the revolutionary government of Iran was anti-American from the beginning. But it was also anti-Israel. Partly, the theocratic government simply sympathizes with the Palestinians in that conflict. But partly also, Israel is seen as a competitor to Iran's power and prestige in the region, a political opponent. For this reason, Iran funds Hezbollah, a Lebanese paramilitary group, as a sort of proxy-army to fight against Israel. Since America is Israel's closest and most powerful ally, this rivalry added to anti-American sentiment in Iran's government. And as time went on, all the way up to today, Iranian politicians use both Israel and the US as "Others," external enemies to unite the Iranian people. Iranians are not on the whole thrilled about their theocratic government. And the younger generation doesn't harbor the same anti-colonial anger that their parents and grandparents do. But like most people, they are quick to unite in the face of an external enemy. When the US tells Iran it cannot have access to nuclear technology (whatever the government's reasons for wanting it), it sounds to many Iranians like just another example of the US interfering in their business.

 

The Taliban

Ah, the Taliban. What can one say about the Taliban? They're quite possibly the most "exotic" government of the 20th century, as Stephen Humphreys has said (Between Memory and Desire). Taliban is derived from the Arabic word for "students," and that's a very apt description of the group that took control of Afghanistan in the mid-1990's.
    After the Soviets fled Afghanistan in 1989, the Mujahideen (rebel Afghan "Holy Warriors") who had chased them out began fighting amongst themselves, further destroying the war-torn country. Into this mix, between 1994 and 1996, Mullah Mohammad Omar led an army made up in large part of teachers and students from Pakistan's Islamic madrasas (Arabic: schools) (largely funded by Saudi Arabia).
    The Taliban were Islamists; that is, they believed in a form of government that enforced Islamic law. But they were more than that. Their brand of Islamic law was based on Wahhabism, an extremely strict interpretation of Islam that came out of Saudi Arabia. This included outlawing music, dance, sports, and basically anything not in the Quran. It included forcing women to wear burqas and remain out of sight; and forcing men to grow beards, neither of which is in the Quran. They massacred Shi'a and Sufis (Muslim mystics) and destroyed religious sites, both Muslim and non-Muslim. This famously included the Buddhas of Bamiyan, carved in the 6th century (Video of the Demolition), but they also destroyed Muslim sites because trying to represent God, even indirectly, was a sin to them. They believed that their interpretation of Islam was the only correct one, and that it was their duty to enforce it upon their fellow Afghans. Anyone who disagreed with them was just as bad as an infidel, even if they were a Muslim.
    At first Afghans welcomed the simple law and order that the Taliban provided. But very quickly the repressive nature of their regime became clear. Not only was the Taliban extremely repressive, but it stifled development and economic activity to the point that Afghanistan was unable to climb out of the ruins of its years of war.
    Very few leaders outside of Afghanistan defended the Taliban. Even Saudi Arabia, which shares the Taliban's Wahhabist ideology, distanced itself from the Taliban. But one of the Taliban's few allies would become their (at least temporary) undoing: Osama bin-Laden.

 

al-Qaeda

Osama bin Laden is to America what Hannibal was to Rome. He is the bogeyman of our entire nation, one man of almost mythic evil status. He has eluded the largest manhunt in history, by two American presidents. And the group that he leads, al-Qaeda ("the Base"), epitomizes Muslim extremist terrorism. When Americans discuss why "they" hate us, al-Qaeda are generally the folks going through their minds.

    Al-Qaeda was formed in 1991 in Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden and a group of hardcore Wahhabists, some of whom had gained fighting experience during the Soviet-Afghan War as Mujahideen, decided that the Saudi Royal family didn't meet their expectations of what true Muslims should be, and should be overthrown. Partly this was a response to the Saudis inviting the American military into the Muslim holy land to help protect against Saddam Hussein. But in fact, al-Qaeda decided that all Muslims who followed any interpretation of Islam besides the one al-Qaeda itself subscribed to were infidels whose lives were forfeit. Bin Laden said of these other Muslims, "They shall be wiped out!" (Aslan 248)
    So al-Qaeda launched a series of attacks against Muslim civilian and military targets, particularly in Egypt and the Sudan. After a failed assassination attempt on the Egyptian president, al-Qaeda was forced to flee North Africa. But nobody was willing to take them; Saudi Arabia had gone so far as to revoke Bin Laden's citizenship. But! Ah, the Taliban. Hardcore Wahhabists just like al-Qaeda, intolerant even of Muslims who disagreed with them, and in need of money and arms. The Taliban welcomed al-Qaeda into Afghanistan, providing them with a safe haven in return for joint military work.
    Al-Qaeda's main enemies were the corrupt Muslim governments. But as Bin Laden saw it, these governments were held in place by their relationship to the Western imperialist powers. So to overthrow them, America (as well as Britain and Israel, who they included in the imperialist axis) had to be taken out of the equation. Bin Laden and his deputies issued a fatwa (a religious decree) in 1998 calling for jihad (by which he meant "holy war") against the United States to expel Americans (and their influence) from Muslim countries.
    Bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri knew that they couldn't defeat the USA by strictly military means. But their goal was to prod and provoke the US until it lashed out. Then, they could "bleed them" dry, just like the mujahideen had bled the Soviets dry in Afghanistan. If America invaded Afghanistan, Bin Laden hoped to drag the US down in a quagmire. This was the underlying strategy of the September 11 attacks (Doran, Understanding the War on Terror, pp. 72-75), and the result (especially since the US then added Iraq to the 'quagmire' game) has yet to be seen. Will the economic and military burden of these wars "bleed" America dry?


Iraq
The invasion of Iraq is an unfinished history. And it is one which is extremely difficult to interpret and talk about without betraying one's opinions. Depending on who one asks, it's either the central front in America's War on Terror and a potential seed of Arab alliance with the West, or a useless and bloody conflict driven by the Bush administration's ties to big business and neo-conservative ideology.
    Actually, all the above statements are true to some extent. The invasion of Iraq was and is bloody. It originally had nothing to do with the struggle against al-Qaeda. But it has become the central front in the War on Terror. Whatever was true in the past, as of today the stability of Iraq has far-reaching implications. In the future it could be America's closest Arab ally, or the biggest breeding ground for Islamic terrorism in the world.
    But the point here is that the violence in Iraq is just as complex from the Iraqi side as it is from the American side. Some of the insurgents are Islamists. But many Islamists in Iraq reject violence and work through elections. Some are anti-American, some anti-Shi'a, some anti-Sunni. They are each fighting (violently or politically) for the future of their country. As America withdraws from Iraq, the insurgency will not necessarily stop. America would just become irrelevant to the conflict. America is already irrelevant in many ways. Many Iraqis resent America's presence in their country, but they are not the ones committing acts of violence (yet - the Iraqi children of today could be the al-Qaeda recruits of tomorrow). The insurgents are struggling for control of their country, to enforce their world view or to prevent some other group from enforcing its world view.
    The violence in Iraq is not hard to understand in the context of a complex society with many competing ideas, which was plunged into anarchy the way that wars and revolution often do. When institutions fall apart, the society fractures, everybody picks a team, and the team that wins gets to run the country. America's hope is that the winning team will be pro-American; Iran would like to see a pro-Iranian winner. And most Iraqis just want things to settle down already.

So what do these groups of Muslim "terrorists" have in common? And is that common ground their religious convictions?

Next:
Part 3: Tying it all together

Part 1: Background: The "Others"


Islamophobia in the West is based on the idea that the world's 1.5 billion Muslims are somehow more disposed toward violence than the other 3/4 of humanity. The wild-eyed Arab Muslim fanatic is a popular image in our culture. Every time you turn on the news, you see angry young Muslim men burning flags, chanting angrily, shooting someone, or chopping off a head. It seems like it's Muslims who are causing the problems of the world. It can be seen on CNN and the nightly news, and it goes back all the way to the Middle Ages. It seems that since the birth of Islam, Western perceptions of Muslims and Arabs have been influenced by their status as a dangerous "Other" - competitors for resources and land, prestige and power. Remember that the Byzantine Empire (European, Christian, and basically Roman) were the first people to have their butts handed to them by the Arab armies. During wars, the leaders of both sides try to demonize the "Other" to motivate their troops and populations. So Europeans and Muslims started off on the wrong cultural foot.
    Later, Caliph Hakim of the Seljuk Turkish Empire, who was a Muslim, incited the Crusades by ordering the burning of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem, and attacking European Christian pilgrims to Palestine. Although Hakim's policy was immediately reversed by his successor (after all, when you make money off the pilgrims, it doesn't make much sense to kill them), Pope Urban II used it as a pretext to launch the Crusades. The Crusades were the epitome of the "holy war," because (like most "holy wars"), deep down it was more about politics than religion. It was about uniting a squabbling Europe and trying to reunite the Roman and Orthodox Churches. Pope Urban said to the nobles of Europe: ... this land that you inhabit, shut in on all sides by the seas and surrounded by the mountain peaks, is too narrow for your large population; nor does it abound in wealth; and it furnishes scarcely food enough for its cultivators. Hence it is that you murder one another, that you wage war, and that frequently you perish by mutual wounds. Let therefore hatred depart from among you, let your quarrels end, let wars cease, and let all dissensions and controversies slumber. Enter upon the road to the Holy Sepulcher; wrest that land from the wicked race, and subject it to yourselves... God has conferred upon you above all nations great glory in arms. Accordingly undertake this journey for the remission of your sins, with the assurance of the imperishable glory of the Kingdom of Heaven.” (Medieval Source book: http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/urban2-5vers.html). The Muslims of Palestine were thoroughly demonized, and, as in most holy wars, the people actually doing the fighting were told time and again that it was about religion, and that anyone who became a martyr fighting for Christ would go to Heaven (sound familiar?).
    The Crusades were bloody and brutal and awful, but in the grand scheme of things they didn't gain their important reputation until modern times. Back then, for the Middle East, the Mongols were a much bigger threat than some pissant white people from Europe. The Muslims restored peace to the Holy Land, but European Christians continued to fight Muslims. Muslim-ruled Spain, one of the greatest examples of Jews, Christians, and Muslims working together to create a beautiful and enlightened society, was gradually retaken by the Catholic monarchs, and the Muslims and Jews driven out. In the East, the Ottoman Empire fought with Austria-Hungary for centuries over the Balkans, two mighty empires battling over European territory.
    But by 1900 the tide had turned decisively against the Ottoman Empire. In the modern age, beginning as early as the 18th century, Christian Europe and the Muslim Middle East were no longer equal competitors. Even before World War I marked the end of the Ottoman Empire, it was obvious that Europe had become far more powerful than any community in the Middle East, or anywhere else for that matter. Europe was unrivaled.
    How this happened will be the topic of another article. The important thing here is that the relationship changed between Europe and the Middle East. They could no longer demonize each other as equals, because the Europeans had acquired the upper hand - in a big way. First indirectly through trade, then directly through empire, Europe took over most of the Middle East. Often these colonial missions went together with a "civilizing mission," in which Europeans tried to impose their values on their colonies. When the people of the Middle East rebelled against these forces, and against the exploitation of their resources and people by the Europeans, this was viewed as violent rabble by the Europeans. The Middle Eastern "Other" no longer a demon, but the object of scorn. The effects of this "civilizing mission" would be far-reaching.
    Possibly the most important legacy of the colonial age came from the combination of imperial exploitation and imposed "democratic" regimes. The Europeans in the Middle East were careful to rule through "native" parliaments and monarchs. But most people were not fooled by this; they knew that these governments were essentially puppets, and complicit in the robbing of natural resources and labor for use by the imperial power. So after World War II, as the European empires retreated, the governments they left behind (while quasi-democratic) stank of imperial tyranny. One by one, most of them were toppled or destabilized, replaced with secular socialist governments that were no less tyrannical, but were at least populist and homegrown. If you ever wonder why there is no democracy in the Middle East, that's part of it.
    This brings us to the modern times. Muslims from the Middle East are clashing with Europeans and Americans in what Samuel Huntington has termed the "Clash of Civilizations." The idea that this is a clash between civilizations has some problems, though. First, if this is a war between Euro-America and Islam, why is there more Muslim-on-Muslim violence than there is Muslim on non-Muslim violence? If Muslim extremists really hated Western ideals like freedom and democracy, why do they focus their attacks on America and Britain and not the Netherlands, where prostitution and "un-Islamic" behavior are more tolerated? Or Denmark, which the non-profit World Audit has called the most "democratic" country in the world? What about the millions of Muslims living in Western countries? What's really behind the violence of groups like Hamas and al-Qaeda? Maybe it would be better to look at some of these groups one by one, to see what they have in common and where they differ.

 

Next: Part 2: Modern Muslim Terrorism

 
UPDATED ON:
MONDAY, JANUARY 12, 2009 
21:39 MECCA TIME, 18:39 GMT
 
 
Israel poll ban for Arab parties
 
Tibi and other Arab MPs have opposed Israel's aerial and ground assault on the Gaza Strip [File: EPA]

Two Arab political parties have been disqualified from running in Israel's parliamentary elections on February 10 after they were accused of not recognising the country's right to exist.

The panel voted on Monday to back a motion filed by two right-wing parties which also accused the National Democratic Assembly (also known as Balad) and Ra'am-Ta'al of incitement and supporting "terrorist" groups.

Ahmed Tibi and Jamal Zahalka, who lead the two Arab rivals in parliament, joined together in condemning Monday's decision.

"It was a political trial led by a group of fascists and racists who are willing to see the Knesset without Arabs and want to see the country without Arabs," Tibi said.

He said that his Ra'am-Ta'al party intended to petition the supreme court about the decision.

"If the members of the panel had weapons, they would have shot us in the head," Tibi said.

'Fifth column'

At a recent Knesset session called to discuss the Israeli assault on the Gaza Strip, Arab MPs condemned the conflict, which has now killed more than 900 Palestinians and injured thousands of others.
 

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"As a humane person, I oppose targeting civilians wherever they are. Naturally, however, every time an Arab is injured it hurts me more because we are members of the same nation," Tibi told the Knesset. 

In response, Avigdor Lieberman, the leader of the Yisrael Beiteinu party which petitioned for the Arab parties to be barred, described the Arab MPs as a "fifth column" clandestinely undermining the nation.

Tibi responded by calling him a "fascist", while Talab al-Sana, another Arab MP, was removed from the meeting after repeatedly interrupting Lieberman's speech. 

Zahalka had boycotted the Knesset session saying he was not willing to take part in a "celebration of death". 

The two parties are the only exclusively Arab blocs in the Israeli Knesset, however the decision does not effect Arabs in predominantly Jewish parties or the communist party.

Together they hold seven of the 120 parliamentary seats.

About one-fifth of Israel's seven million citizens are Arabs with full citizenship rights, but have suffered due to discrimination and poverty.

Most are descended from the 160,000 Palestinians who remained after the creation of Israel in 1948 and the war on Gaza has heightened tensions between the communities.

 

 
 Source:Agencies
I'm not touching this with a ten-foot pole. Just thought it was an interesting situation that highlights the complexity of the conflict. 

As I write this, Israel and Hamas are fighting each other in the Gaza Strip, to the world's horror. Whenever the Israeli-Palestinian conflict flares up like this, people inevitably say something like, “Those people have been killing each other forever; they're not going to stop any time soon.” The problem with this line of thinking is that not only is it overly-pessimistic, but it's wrong. Well, okay, people everywhere have been killing each other forever, but the Israeli-Palestinian conflict itself is a much newer phenomenon.
    Judaism, Christianity, and Islam all stem from the same tradition. At the time of Muhammad, most of the Middle East (west of Persia) was Christian, but Arabians were still pagan. The Quran was conceived as God's revelations specifically to the pagan Arabians, who were then to spread this, the last prophecy of God, to the other nas al-kitaab (“People of the Book”) who had misinterpreted the revelations of prophets like Moses and Jesus, and distorted their doctrines. Islam was an update, the way Christianity had been an update to Judaism.
    When the Arab armies conquered Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt, they encountered a population that was part pagan, part Jewish, and mostly Christian. As discussed in the last entry, the People of the Book were allowed to worship and live as they pleased, so long as they paid their taxes.
    That said, over the centuries, sometimes the reality on the street was somewhat different. It can safely be said that before the foundation of Israel, there really was no truly safe place in the world for Jews. In both Christian Europe and the Muslim Middle East, Jews were at times scapegoated by angry mobs and local demagogues.
    In the Holy Land itself, Palestine, all three faiths coexisted under the Caliphate. In fact, Palestine is notable for it's general lack of pogroms against Jews (except during the Crusades, when Christian soldiers from Europe invaded the Holy Land and killed many Jews). Elsewhere in the Muslim world, as in Europe, Jews were occasionally persecuted. Notable pogroms in Muslim lands occurred in Grenada in 1066; Morocco in 1033, 1276, and 1465; Persia in 1839; and in Baghdad in 1941.
    Still, Jews were arguably safer in Muslim lands than they were in Christian lands. Jews being persecuted in Europe usually fled to Muslim countries: from England in 1290; France in 1391; Austria in 1421; Spain in 1492; Portugal in 1497. Most Jewish refugees from Europe fled to Morocco or Palestine.
    This brings us to the cause of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In 1896, Theodor Hertzl, a Hungarian Jewish journalist, wrote Der Judenstaat (“The Jewish State”), which articulated the realization among some European Jews that no matter how good things were beginning to get for them in Europe, they'd never truly be safe from persecution until they had their own state and government. This was Zionism, which referred to the Biblical Land of Zion, given by God to the Israelites. In 1897 the First Zionist Congress declared its decision to set up a Jewish national home in Palestine.
    At first this was a fringe idea, and small groups of European Jews moved to Palestine starting in the 1870's and established communes. The Ottoman Turkish government, which controlled Palestine at the time, tried unsuccessfully to slow European Jewish immigration to Palestine. Over time, the idea grew, which began to cause friction, because the European immigrants upset the landlord relationship present in Palestine at the time. Most Palestinians didn't own the land on which they lived and worked. They rented it from a landlord. But if that landlord sold his land to a group of European Jewish immigrants, suddenly all the peasants working that land were homeless and without a way to feed their families.
    At first this only affected a small number of people, but Zionism as an idea was gaining steam in Europe. After World War I, control of Palestine passed to Britain, and Jewish immigration sped up. More and more Palestinians were losing their land and forming an urban underclass. And it must be kept in mind that the European immigrants were forcing Palestinians off their land regardless of their religion, and many Jewish and Christian Palestinians lost their land to the newcomers. The conflict's divide was not yet between Muslim and Jew, but between Arab and European. 
    That changed in 1920. That year, tensions boiled over and riots erupted between Arabs and European Jews in Palestine. Anti-semitism began growing in the non-Jew Palestinian population. After that, Palestinian Jews increasingly identified with the Zionists.
    After the outbreak of riots, Britain began to reconsider its support for Jewish immigration to Palestine. They tried to limit immigration, but by that time the rise of Hitler in Germany made it impossible. Jews were pouring out of Germany, fleeing persecution. Most went to America, but many went to Palestine.
    The Jewish immigrants were well-funded, well-organized, and shared a common ideology and world view. There was a real spirit of camaraderie and cooperation among them, especially on the communes, and especially with the rise of Hitler. They bought as much of the best land in Palestine as they could, and they set up a parallel government (the Jewish Agency) besides the British colonial government. They joined the Royal Army and Royal Air Force and became skilled soldiers.
    The Palestinians, on the other hand, were generally poor. They were divided along tribal lines and effectively leaderless. They worked within the British colonial government, and were as such dependent on it. This would become significant later, when that government ceased to be.
    By 1945 the European Jewish population of Palestine had swelled to 25% of the whole. Britain had tried to work out a settlement between the two sides, without success. The Zionist government in Palestine felt confident about its own power. The Zionist army, which had gained experience fighting with the British and had become skilled veterans, began attacking British troops and bombing British military sites. They raided guns and even tanks, stockpiling them. Meanwhile, riots between Palestinians and Jews continued.
    Between 1947 and 1948 Britain decided that enough was enough and began walking away. As they left, war broke out between the Zionists and the Palestinians, which the Zionists easily won. As the Zionists took control of Palestine, they evicted the Palestinians who remained in Jewish-controlled areas, forcibly removing hundreds of thousands of non-Jews. Many other Palestinians fled their homes, expecting to return once the Zionists were defeated.
    As soon as the British had completely left, on 14 May 1948, the State of Israel declared its independence. The Jewish Agency became the government of Israel, and David Ben-Gurion became the first Prime Minister.
    Immediately the Arab states around Israel launched a combined attack. Israel was completely surrounded and cut off by a British blockade, but they managed to stave off the attack and maintain their independence. This unlikely victory against overwhelming odds has cemented itself in Israeli popular history, an object of wonder at how close the Jewish state came to not existing. Since then, Israelis have maintained a strong military, in which every young Israeli must serve. They have fought numerous wars with the Arab countries around them, who traditionally sympathized with the displaced Palestinians. Each time, the survival of the tiny country was thrown into question, and the mindset of struggling for their very survival is omnipresent in Israeli society and politics.
    Similarly, Palestinians felt that they were fighting for their survival as a people. Most Palestinians live in refugee camps in Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt, or in the two parts of Palestine not taken by the Israelis – the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. From there, they launch attacks into Israel, guerilla raids, suicide bombings, and rocket attacks. To many of these Palestinian fighters, civilians are considered fair game, because every Israeli man, woman, and child is essentially an invader. It is not about religion, but about their displacement before the Manifest Destiny of Zionism. They are afraid of going the way of the native Americans.

    For most Israelis , it is not about religion either. Rather, they fear for the survival of their community and their culture, and they defend it tooth and nail against any threat. The mantra, “Never again,” referring to the Holocaust, is viscerally felt by many Israelis. And they feel that if Israel looses, just once, then the safety embodied by a Jewish state will be lost forever. Both sides are fighting for the existence of their identity.
    This is the root of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Not religion. And the conflict hasn't been going on for thousands of years. The conflict began with the Zionist-Arab riots of 1920, and really got started when Israel was declared in 1948. This is not to say that the problem is easily solvable; it isn't. So many wrongs have been committed in the last 60 years that neither side wants to give an inch. And it will not end easily or soon, in all likelihood. But it isn't an ancient or inherent struggle, which should give us some hope that it can be ended.

For more information I highly recommend Ken Blady's book Jewish Communities in Exotic Places, which documents the Jewish experience not only in the Middle East, but all over the world. Specific to Palestine, Ilan Pappe's A History of Modern Palestine is extremely comprehensive and accessible.

AirTran boots a Muslim family [editorial]

  • Jan. 2nd, 2009 at 8:22 AM

On New Year's Day, Atif Irfan sat on a plane with his family, ready for their flight from Washington, D.C. to Orlando, Florida. Irfan was a normal American citizen, a tax attorney. He and his loved ones were flying that day to attend a religious conference with more family members in Orlando, and as the plane idled, they discussed the safest seats to occupy in the event of a crash. [It's possible that they had seen the same recent How Stuff Works documentary that I just saw. The answer, if you care, is that you are statistically more likely to survive a plane crash the further toward the back of the plane you are. Just a side note.]

As they discussed airplane safety, several of the passengers around them became concerned and went to the flight attendents, voicing their suspicions that this family was in fact a terrorist cell. The family was taken off the plane and interrogated by the FBI. When it became clear to investigators that there was nothing to be concerned about, the Feds tried to get the family back onto the airplane, but AirTran, the carrier, categorically refused to readmit them.

Now, I've gotten used to the Orwellian atmosphere of America since 9/11, where every citizen spies on every other citizen. That's not surprising.

What depresses me is that because of their ethnic background, this totally innocuous American family, who were just discussing things that any airplane passenger might be expected to discuss, aroused suspicion in their fellow American passengers. And that even after they were cleared by the FBI, AirTran refused to seat them. If Atif's name had been Todd, this never would have happened.

Sometimes I'm very proud to be an American. But when I read something like this, I feel nothing but bitter shame. I hope the people who complained to the flight attendents, and whoever decided not to let Irfan and his family back on board, are haunted by their inexcusable bigotry. I pray that they are unable to rationalize their racism to themselves, that they cannot simply tell themselves they were being careful, they were doing their civic duty, they were being on the safe side. I hope they see what they did yesterday for what it was.

Myth #1: Islam was "spread by the sword."

  • Dec. 29th, 2008 at 6:39 PM

Many Americans think of Muslims as intolerant, and it's fair to say there is a certain degree of intolerance in the Muslim world today. But I've also heard people say that it's been like that since the beginning, that Islam was a religion "spread by the sword" through conquest and forced conversions. The real story is much less fearsome.
    Islam's prophet, Muhammad, was a merchant who lived in Mecca, in today's Saudi Arabia. At the time the Arabian people were polytheistic, and Mecca was a pilgrimage site because it housed the Ka'ba, a cubic shrine which contained (and still contains) the Black Stone, probably a meteorite, that was considered holy.
    Muhammad was an extremely spiritual man, and often went out into the deserts around Mecca to meditate. Beginning around 610CE, while on a meditation retreat, Muhammad began receiving visits from the angel Gabriel, who revealed for him the final revelations of God, the same God worshipped by the Jews and the Christians. These revelations would become the Quran. When Muhammad went public with his revelations, the people who ran Mecca didn't take kindly to this monotheistic religion, since they were polytheists and their income came mostly from polytheistic pilgrims visiting the Ka'ba. So Muhammad and his small group of followers were banished. They went to Medina, an oasis town, and Muhammad converted the polytheists of Medina. There was also a community of Jews in Medina, who did not convert but did become part of the community under Muhammad's leadership.
    Muhammad used Medina as a staging ground to convert other small villages. He gradually built up such a following that in 629 he amassed an army and marched right into Mecca, taking control without a fight by promising the city leadership safety of life and property. They accepted conversion and were absorbed into the Muslim leadership. Meanwhile, the Muslims made alliances with nearby tribal leaders, some of whom converted and some didn't. Whether someone converted or not, they had to recognize Muhammad as their leader. This was fine in theory, but the other Arabian leaders didn't agree on much, and Muhammad constantly had to think of ways to keep them from going to war with each other. Tribal warfare had been a big part of Arabian life before Muhammad's leadership, and Muhammad had explicitly forbidden raiding and warfare between groups within the umma. One historian put it like this: “The umma could not stand still, it had to expand or disintegrate... If raiding within the community was to be abolished another outlet had to be found for the martial energies of the tribesmen and another source of revenue for the impoverished nomad.” (Kennedy 48)
    This became all the more important after Muhammad died, in June of 632. Without the charismatic leadership of the Prophet, the umma's leaders had to work hard to keep the alliances together. So they raided and they conquered. Syria and Mesopotamia came first. This was the border area between the Byzantine Empire and the Persian Empire. And as both empires were in decline, the whole area was ripe for the taking. Next came Palestine, then Egypt, etc. Eventually the Arab Empire would stretch from Spain to Pakistan.

    The Arabs were fierce warriors, but they were desert people and knew nothing about governing real cities like Jerusalem and Damascus, cities which made Mecca look like a campground. So their strategy was to leave the people of the new territories alone. The old leadership and government remained, and Jews and Christians could worship as they pleased. But everyone had to pay taxes to the Arabs. One of these taxes was the jizya, or “protection” tax. All non-Muslims paid the jizya, and in return they were exempted from conscription into the army. If someone converted, they would be exempt from this tax, but would probably be drafted into the army.
    There were no forced conversions to Islam in the conquered territories, for two reasons. First, when you start messing with people's beliefs, it becomes really hard to govern them, and the Arabs didn't want to cause more headaches for themselves. Second, every new Muslim meant another person who was exempt from the jizya (more Muslims = less money for the Arabs). Polytheistic temples were forbidden, but Jews and Christians (called nas al-kitaab or “people of the Book”) were allowed to worship as they please. After all, they worshiped the same God.
    However, as the Arab empire (called the Caliphate, ruled by a Caliph (khalifa means “deputy” of the Prophet)) settled down and became a government in the traditional sense, many and then most of the people living in the territory eventually converted to Islam. This happened over hundreds of years, for many reasons, but mostly because Islam was the religion on the upper classes, so it was the religion of social mobility in the empire. Nobody was forced into it, it just made practical sense for many people. And up until 1948 (the year Israel was founded) non-Muslims in Muslim-ruled lands were far safer than religious minorities in Christian lands.

In writing this, I got most of my the dates and such from:
The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates, by Hugh Kennedy
The Life of Muhammad, translated and edited by 'Abd al-Malik Ibn Hashim and Alfred Guillaume

I tried to find some good online sources on this, but I gave up. Most of the stuff online is biased either for or against the Arab armies. Wikipedia's not biased, but it's only so good.

The thing I like most about studying Middle East and Islamic history is that it's an area most Americans don't know anything about, and I think it would be good to teach Americans about it as a career. But that is also the most frustrating  thing about studying Mid-East history. On TV, at school, among my friends and family, I am forced to endure an endless stream of misconceptions that good, intelligent Americans have about the Middle East and Islam, repeating over and over things that I know to be untrue.

Now I know the "Stupid Americans" theme is as old as apple pie itself, and I'm not saying that at all. People all over the world have funny ideas about far off cultures. It's no surprise that we know more about those close to us than those who are less familiar. You should hear the nonsense some Arabs think is true of Westerners.My goal here is to try to correct some myths that I think are important. Myths that stand in the way of our progress and even our safety. Myths that, for the love of all that is holy, we have to stop embracing.

So over the next week I'll be posting essays on the three biggest and most obstructive (in my opinion) myths about the Middle East and Islam that I hear a lot. I'll add references and links to news and informational articles. I've done my best to keep my personal opinions out of it. I think one reason I've been ignored when I try to dispute these myths is that the folks I'm talking to have different political opinions than I do. They may dismiss what I'm saying as a simple difference of opinion. Fair enough, but opinions aside, I'm just going to try to shed light on some confusing and complicated issues.

Back Downtown

  • Jul. 28th, 2008 at 1:03 PM

So here I am, back downtown, back in the New Palace Hotel. My stay in Egypt seems to have come full circle. As I checked into my shitty hotel room (LE30 or $6 per night), I thought of the night I arrived here, flu-stricken, tired, happy just to be in Egypt, excited by the morning call to prayer when it woke me up. Now I'm used to Egypt; I don't even notice the call to prayer anymore unless I'm right next to a mosque. I'm used to the dirty dinginess of the buildings downtown. But I've also spent two months living in one of the nicest neighborhoods in Cairo, so I have to admit, my lip curled a bit in disgust as I surveyed my new room, just for a second, before I forced it to stop being bourgeois. My disgust was confirmed, however, when I tried to go to sleep in the stuffy, non-air-conditioned, fan-less room. Finally I couldn't stands it no more. I opened the window, and today I have the resulting mosquito bites. Between the poor night's sleep and being COVERED in mosquito bites, I'm grouchy enough to entertain thoughts of being a rich philanthropist. And my gift to the world will be solar-powered bug zappers every ten square feet on the entire surface of planet Earth. With any luck, I can drive the mosquito into extinction.

It didn't help that a couple days ago  I spent the whole day in Maadi, the most upper-class neighborhood in the city, on the south side on the east bank of the Nile. There you can see Porsche SUV's and BMW's. I went because my friend Linda, an Egyptian-American from North Carolina, wanted to visit her old neighbodhood, her old house, and her old friend (who was very cool and very beautiful but whose name completely escapes me).

In Egypt, you can tell a nice neighborhood from the rest by the presence of trees. Zemalek, Maadi, Mohandessin, and Nasr City all have trees. The rest of Cairo doesn't. So these neighborhoods are really pleasant to walk around during the day. Not that we walked. Linda's friend picked us up from the metro in her SUV-thing and we drove down Linda's Memory Lane. Her school was very interesting - the Cairo America College. It's actually a kindergarten - 12th grade academy that started off as a school for Americans and Europeans, the children of diplomats and neo-colonialists, etc. The neighborhood of Maadi grew up around it, with nice villas and lots of trees, because it was Little America! Eventually, however, upper-class Cairenes were allowed to attend the school, and most of them do these day. This in turn is why upper-crust Cairenes speak such impeccable English.

The difference between upper- and lower-class Egyptians is stark. Unfortunately, since I went to the American University, most of the Egyptian friends I've made are from the upper strata. They're Old Rich, people with connections, who trace their grandparents to the Revolution, whose parents hold positions like Deputy Minister of the Interior, and Vice-President of Citibank for the Middle East. They can't stand the New Rich, that small rising class of entrepreneurs (who will eventually save this country from its poverty). They have what's called the khawaga complex, the foreigner complex. They immerse themselves in Western, particularly American, culture, and they dismissively explain away many Egyptian quirks and problems in vague terms like "culture" and "tradition." Though at the end of the day, they really do love their country. How could they not? It's been good to them.

The Egyptian poor is a whole different world. A good many of them live on LE10 ($2) a day. They don't know English, nor do they know Standard Arabic. They can't read or write, they went to shitty schools for a few years before dropping out because begging from tourists put food on their family's table. They get a manual job or a job in the bloated government bureaucracy if they can. To minimize unemployment (while preventing non-connected Egyptians from starting their own businesses), the government hires five people to do any job that requires one person. Even still there's a 20% unemployment rate. Many people try to make a living by swindling tourists, apparently with some success because it's a huge business. Those without the skills needed to cheat foreigners stagnate on the dole, restless souls who mill about mosques and shisha bars all day. Despite what the rich say about "culture" and "tradition" holding Egypt back, these folks have real, valid reasons for doing the things they do, which don't always make sense to Westerners. And they are not the cause of, but the victims of, Egypt's stagnation. It just drives me nuts, because the Egyptian people have so much potential. All they need is a good government that will allow them to use it. Instead, you have PhD's working as hotel bellmen, cab drivers who fluently speak eight languages, and children who beg instead of going to school because if they didn't their family couldn't eat. Like Gandhi said, "Poverty is the worst form of violence." Okay, I'm going to stop ranting.

The last few days have been one good-bye scene after another. I'm happy my time here is coming to an end, and that I can go home to the city and people I love. But I'm tired of saying good-bye to all the awesome people I've met this summer. This summer has just been so crazy and unreal and full... Jenny put it best: "If I woke up, and this whole trip turned out to be one big crazy dream, I really wouldn't be surprised."

And now all the good-byes are finished. Even my Egyptian friends are vacationing on the North Coast. Now I'm back on Orabi Street downtown, and it's all hellos. It's like my first week all over again, lots of sight-seeing, reading, writing, thinking, browsing the souqs (bazaars) and people-watching while I smoke shisha. Last night there was a big football match between Ahly and Zemalek, and I sat in Talaat Harb Square with immense crowds crammed around cafes with televisions. Cheers went up around the whole downtown when Ahly scored. I asked the guy I was with, Ahram, from Upper Egypt, why this game was so big, and he said he didn't know, he was just here for the shisha and the atmosphere. I laughed and said, "Me too," and we raised our shisha tubes in a toast.

I'm back to making random short-term friends in cafes, but the swindlers have also come back into my life. Only now, instead of answering them in English or Fus-ha (Standard Arabic, which didn't impress them and often confused them), now I can speak with them in Egyptian, and they soon move on. You can tell them from the genuinely open people because friendly people only start conversations when you're sitting near each other in a cafe or something. If someone falls into step with you while you're walking and says anything at all to you, they are trying to scam you. And every time that happens I rub my brow and heave a sigh. I wish my Irish blood would have let me tan more deeply over the last two months, maybe I wouldn't have this problem.

Hassan and Marcus

  • Jul. 25th, 2008 at 1:21 AM

I just went with my friend Chris downtown to see Hasan wa Marqus, this summer's Egyptian blockbuster. It stars Adel Imam, a great Egyptian comedy actor, and Omar Sharif, who even Americans know as a film legend (Lawrence of Arabia). At the shisha place where my friends and I hang out, the televisions often come on with ads for Hasan wa Marqus, and each time, I've been drawn to it, and finally I decided I just had to see it.

The premise is that Adel Imam plays a Coptic priest in Cairo, who is a leader in... I think it was called the Union of the Cross and the Crescent, essentially an organization of Copts and Muslims working together. For this, he is targeted by Muslim fundamentalists, who bomb his car. He survives, and is carted off by the Egyptian witness protection program. They send give him a new identity as a Muslim sheikh and set him up in Minia. (Minia is Egypt's hotbed of sectarian violence. Earlier this year a number of Coptic monks were killed there.) (A funny scene: The witness protection guy says "...and you must leave tomorrow for Minia." And the whole family goes, "MINIA!?").

Meanwhile, Omar Sharif is a Muslim sheikh in Cairo, and is also targeted by Islamic fundamentalists (this I'm not so clear on, I think maybe because of something he said during one of his sermons?). Anyway, they burn his apartment building down. His family is likewise sent by the witness protection agency to Minia - disguised as a Coptic family.

The two happen to move into the same apartment building and strike up a friendship, each thinking that the other is the opposite religion than they are. This produces a lot of funny situations, until the Copt-as-Muslim guy's son falls in love with the Muslim-as-Copt guy's daughter. The two families become dramatically closer, and it seems a perfect analogy for the coexistence of religions. Until the young man tells the girl the truth about his identity. The shroud of friendship between the families is shattered. You see, for each family, being friends with someone of the "other" religion was fine, because they actually saw them as members of their own real religion. When they found out they really were of different faiths after all, they disowned each other.

It's at this time that the intolerance of Minia reaches a fevered pitch, and on one fateful Sabbath (Friday), the mosques and churches let out a mob of angry intolerant youth who begin attacking each other because of something their preachers said that I didn't understand. Sticks are swung, Molotov cocktails are thrown, and the two central families must stick together to overcome the danger.

Some Egyptians said that the movie blew Muslim-Coptic friction out of proportion, and that's certainly true. But most movies do, really. It's a big "What if..." scenario. And it was just fun - it was really funny in the first half (even for me, who only got half the jokes), it was really touching, and there were some pretty awesome mob action scenes.

And at the end of the day, it had a good message. In the opening scene of the Union of the Cross and the Crescent, two Copts are muttering to each other, "Damn Muslims, every time we build a church, they build a big mosque right in front of it. Don't we have rights too?" And a couple of Muslims on the other end of the room are muttering, "I don't get what their problem is. The Christians have three-quarters of the wealth of Egypt, and they still say they are oppressed." Later, you see these two pairs both chanting "Long live the Union of the Cross and the Crescent!" But by the end the message is clear - rhetoric about how "We're all Egyptians" is meaningless (oh geez, and people love to say that when the topic comes up). Christians and Muslims must actually work together, truly love each other as people and not identities.

All in all a good movie.

The Whirling Dervishes

  • Jul. 16th, 2008 at 11:19 PM

Dervish is the name of someone who's been inducted into a Sufi order. The Sufis are various Islamic mystical orders who use various forms of meditation (called dhikr, "remembrance" of God) to achieve a closeness to God that most of us mere mortals only get when we bite the big one (if we're good) - intense prayer, chanting, poetry, yoga, asceticism, etc. The most famous Sufi (at least in the Western world) was Rumi. Rumi and his followers expressed their devotion to God through poetry, song, and dance. Rumi's love poetry endures to this day, and is really good for impressing a girlfriend/boyfriend, even though they're all about God.

A couple of samples (I'm sure they're even more beautiful in the original Persian):

A lover asked his beloved,
Do you love yourself more
than you love me?

The beloved replied,
I have died for myself
and I live for you.

I have disappeared from myself
and my attribute.
I am present only in you.

I have forgotten all my learning,
but from knowing you
I have become a scholar.

I have lost all my strength,,
but from your power
I am able.

If I love myself
I love you.
If I love you
I love myself.


And:

When I am with you
we stay up all night.
And when you're not here
I cannot sleep.
Praise God for these two insomnias!
And the difference between them.


When Rumi died, his followers started the Mewlewi Sufi Order, which has come to be known worldwide as the Whirling Dervishes. The order was founded in Turkey, where Rumi lived, and his bloodline continues to run it (or so it is said). I'm not sure how a branch of the order came to be in Egypt, but they are different than the original order in Turkey.

Whirling Dervishes meditate by playing music and spinning, spinning, spinning. They perform for audiences, and I'm sure the performance is different than the actual meditation, but the spirituality and - frankly - sheer impressiveness of the performance makes up for any inauthenticity. It began with a huge show of percussion, several dervishes in white moving in tandem around each other as they beat their drums hypnotically. One man had hand-cymbals, and as he moved among the others, he shook, turned, and interacted (almost flirted) with them. Strings and horns joined the fray, and this went on for a while, taking us through happiness, excitement, serenity, and back. It was like the Grateful Dead doing a reunion tour with God. Then a man came out in an ornate gown whose bottom half flared out as he began spinning. A man on the second floor stage began singing an epic poem in Arabic. I had no idea what he was saying, but it sounded beautiful with the music. The man in the center spun to the music, slowing and speeding up in time, changing his pose, swinging his arms, but never stopping. As the poem progressed, he pulled the top layer of his gown off and held it spinning above his head. He handed it to a man behind him, mid-spin, without missing a beat. Now his gown was solid green, and he finished off with a flourish half an hour later to a thrilling crescendo, and the poem ended. He stopped spinning for the first time in 40 minute, stood solidly, and bowed. As he retreated from the stage, the music began again, quietly. The voice rang out with another poem, three spinners came out with multi-colored gowns, and performed essentially the same theme, only louder and more impressive.

It was awesome, and words can't really convey why it was so awesome, I guess. All I can say is that every so often a Mewlewi (Turkish: Mevlevi) group will tour the US and perform for audiences. If you can, see it. You won't regret it. It's absolutely stunning.

Haven't Posted In a While

  • Jul. 15th, 2008 at 11:24 PM

The other day Kelly and I tried to go see the Twirling Dervishes. But none of the cab drivers knew where we were trying to get to. We they kept pulling over to ask people if they knew where these crazy Americans were trying to go. Eventually we got to the right neighborhood, in the heart of Islamic Cairo and way off the tourist beaten path, and drove around in circles. My favorite moment came when our driver pulled over in front of a shisha cafe and asked one of the folks sitting there for directions. The guy got up and talked to him in Arabic for a minute, then switched to English and asked me where we were trying to go. I explained it to him, and showed him the crappy guidebook map we had, and he was puzzled. So he asked his friend, who got up from the table to talk about it. Then a couple of the people from nearby tables came over and they all huddled around the map, debating landmarks and streets. Seeing the commotion, more and more people were getting up from their tables until - I am not kidding - every person in the cafe except maybe an employee or two was standing outside our cab trying to direct us. "You want to go this way." "No, it's down that way, where they have the party every year." If there's one image I want to retain from my time here when I return to America, I want it to be that one. An entire cafe standing outside a cab trying to direct a couple of stupid Americans and their frustrated cab driver. It just sums up so well the kind-hearted friendliness that Egyptians extend to the people around them, without thinking twice about it.

Eventually they pointed us in the right direction, and we arrived at the "Dervish Theater." Unfortunately we had based the trip on stories from our fellow travelers and the existence on the map of a place called "Dervish Theater," so it took us until then to learn that "Dervish Theater" is just the name of a theater, like Goodman or Allstate. The Dervishes performed on the other side of Islamic Cairo in the mosque where they resided. No wonder everyone was confused! So, no Twirling Dervishes that night. But we walked around this new neighborhood for a while, enjoying the narrow cobblestone streets, the donkey-drawn carts (donkey-drawn carts are common enough in Egypt, but we weren't used to seeing them in Cairo), and the old mason buildings (one thing Egyptians can't understand about foreigners is how fascinated we are by the old sections of the city. What looks beautiful and historic to us is simply old and run-down to them). Then a car passed us, stopped, and reversed back. "Are you lost?" asked the woman in the passenger seat. Kelly and I looked at each other and shrugged. "Which way is it to Khan al-Khalili?" Kelly asked. The man in the driver seat said, "Oh, it's right up this way a bit. You need a ride? Hop in." Again, Kelly and I looked at each other and shrugged, and got in.

They were Sam and Maha, a young Egyptian couple who had fallen in love while studying in Los Angeles and recently moved back to Cairo. They were glad to meet a couple of Americans and we talked excitedly about America, Egypt, our stay, their stay, etc. "We'll show you this great coffee house in the Khan, you'll love it," Maha said. At some point Sam mentioned that they were on their way to Karfour, a mall on the edge of the city, to return some electronics he'd bought that hadn't worked right. It took me a few minutes of heading in the wrong direction to realize that we had unexpectedly been roped into running this errand with Sam and Maha BEFORE going to the Khan. When we realized this, we exchanged another look, another shrug, and went back to enjoying Sam and Maha's company. They were very nice. THIS episode sums up so well the kind-hearted friendliness that Egyptians extend to the people around them, without thinking twice about it, and without the Americans realizing exactly what that friendliness means. So we joined them for their trip to return Sam's laptop charger, two total strangers we had met twenty minutes ago. It ended up being a very long night. But Sam and Maha were great (cousins who are married, another Egyptian oddity), and we exchanged phone numbers before parting. As we walked away from them, Kelly and I exchanged a laugh and a shrug. "It's Egypt."